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The Misappropriation Theory.
as a Permissible Basis
of Section 10(b) Liability
United States v. 0 'Hagan'
I. INTRODUCTION

Whether the misappropriation theory is a permissible basis for liability
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act is an issue that has split the

U.S. Courts of Appeals. 2 The issue turns on the statutory interpretation of
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,3 as well as policy considerations. 4 The Supreme

Court finally settled the issue in UnitedStates v. O'Hagan,when it reversed the
Eighth Circuit and permitted the United States government to base section 10(b)
liability on the misappropriation theory.5 The effect of the Court's decision is
to make a person liable under section 10(b) if he received material and nonpublic information from someone to whom he owed a fiduciary duty, traded in
securities for his personal profit based on such information, and did so without
disclosing his trading activities to the fiduciary.6
II. FAcTS AND HOLDING
Following an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), the United States indicted and subsequently convicted James Herman
O'Hagan for fifty-seven counts of mail fraud, securities fraud, and money
laundering.7
O'Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney when Grand
Met, a London-based company, hired Dorsey & Whitney to represent it in an
attempt to acquire Pillsbury Company (Pillsbury).8 Before Grand Met could

1. 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), rev'g 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(5) (1994). See infraParts III.C, and D.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(5) (1994). 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
4. See infra notes 205-08 and accompanying text.
5. O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2213-14. The Court also addressed the issue of whether
the Securities and Exchange Commission exceeded its rule-making authority when it
promulgated Rule 14e-3(a), but that issue is beyond the scope of this Note. See id at
2215-17.
6. Id
7. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,117
S. Ct. 759, rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
8. Id
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make a tender offer to Pillsbury, it had to sell a subsidiary company to raise the
capital to finance the purchase.'
During this several-month waiting period, O'Hagan bought 3000 call
options" for Pillsbury stock and bought approximately 5000 additional shares
outright." After Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer to acquire2
Pillsbury, Pillsbury's stock rose from $39 per share to nearly $60 per share.'
Soon after this price increase, O'Hagan exercised his options to buy Pillsbury
stock at the previously set price, then immediately sold the stock along with the
other 5000 shares he owned for a profit of over $4 million. 3 The SEC soon
started an investigation of O'Hagan, which resulted in the United States indicting
O'Hagan for violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange
Act' 4 O'Hagan was convicted on all fifty-seven counts ofmail fraud, securities
fraud and money laundering, and he subsequently appealed the convictions to
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals."
O'Hagan argued that the liability theory under which he was convicted, the
"misappropriation theory," is an impermissible basis for conviction under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. 6 The government argued that the
misappropriation theory is a permissible basis for liability under section 10(b),
so the convictions should be affirmed.' 7 The district court upheld the jury's
verdict convicting O'Hagan on all fifty-seven counts and sentenced him to fortyone months in prison.' 8
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed O'Hagan's convictions on all
fifty-seven counts, holding that his convictions under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act could not be based on the misappropriation theory. 9
The court held that buying shares of Pillsbury's stock based upon material nonpublic information that O'Hagan learned from Grand Met, his firm's client, was
9. Id
10. A call option gives the buyer of the option the right to purchase a specified
number of shares of stock at a price set at the time the call option is sold. There is
generally a deadline for purchasing the stock, after which the call option expires. Id. at
614 n.I.
Each call option O'Hagan bought gave him the right to purchase 100 shares of
Pillsbury stock. Id By the time Grand Met made Pillsbury a tender offer, O'Hagan had
2500 call options remaining, the other 500 had expired. Id at 614 n.2.
11. Id at614.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
15. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 614.
16. Id at615.
17. Id at 617.
18. Id at 614.
19. Id at 622, 627. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/7
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not sufficient to support such a conviction where he did not owe a fiduciary duty
to Pillsbury's shareholders.20
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict among the circuits The Court subsequently held that a person violates
section 10(b) ofthe Securities and Exchange Act when he buys or sells securities
for a personal profit based on non-public information misappropriated in breach
of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information
Il. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The MisappropriationDoctrine and
Its Applicability to Section 10(b)
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
It shall be unlawfiul for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange-... (b) To use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security ... any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Thus, the keys to section 10(b) liability are manipulation and deception. 24

20. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 614. The court also held that the SEC exceeded its rule
making authority in passing section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act, but that portion
of the decision is beyond the scope of this Note. See infra note 220.
21. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
22. 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997), rev'g92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996). The Court also held
that the Securities and Exchange Commision did not exceed its rule-making authority
when it promulgated Rule 14e-3(a) without requiring that the trading entail a breach of
fiduciary duty. Id at 2215-17.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
24. See O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 615. United States v. OHagan deals only with
deception, not manipulation. Idt Section 10(b) manipulation is "'virtually a term of art
when used in connection with securities markets.' referring to practices "such as wash
sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to mislead investors by
artificially affecting market activity." Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476
(1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,.425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Acting pursuant to its authority granted by section 10(b), the Securities
and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule lOb-5.26 Rule lOb-5 provides in
relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentalityof interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange, (a) [to employ any device,
(c) [tio engage in any act, practice, or
scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] ...
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, inconnection with the purchase or sale of any security.F
while
Rule lOb-5 includes a prohibition of conduct constituting "fraud,"
section 10(b) does not mention fraud, only manipulation or deception.l
Through court decision, two theories of construing the scope of conduct
prohibited by section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 have developed. The classical theory
prohibits a person from buying or selling securities on the basis of non-public,
material information if that person is an insider of the corporation whose
securities are traded?' The classical theory does not reach "outsiders"--those
individuals who do not owe a fiduciary obligation to the corporation whose
shares are traded? 1
The second theory, the misappropriation theory, stems from the use ofthe
word "fraud" in Rule lOb-5. This theory has been held to impose section 10(b)
liability on an individual who "(1) misappropriates material non-public
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and
confidence and (3) uses that information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless
of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock." 2
The misappropriation theory does not focus on whether the person trading
the securities owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation whose stock is traded?

25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) ("[I]n contravention of... regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors:).
26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1997).
27. Id,
28. Id
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
30. See United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,616 (8th Cir. 1996), cert.granted,
117 S. CL 759, rev'd, 117 S. CL 2199 (1997). See also SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,443
(9th Cir. 1990); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-67 (1983); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d
403, 408 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,502 U.S. 1071 (1992).
31. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 616 (citing Clark,915 F.2d at 443).
32. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting Clark, 915
F.2d at 443).
33. CheHf,933 F.2d at 409.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/7
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It focuses on whether the individual trading securities misappropriated the
information, in other words, whether he or she breached a fiduciary duty to any
lawful possessor ofmaterial non-public information. 4 The requirement that the
information be used "in connection with the purchase and sale of any security"
is satisfied when the information is used in a subsequent securities transaction?
Therefore, the misappropriation theory focuses on whether the securities trader
"breached a fiduciary obligation to the party from whom the material non-public
information was obtained, notwithstanding whether that party had any
connection to, or even an interest in, the securities transaction ...,36
B. Relevant Supreme Court Cases
The Supreme Court has spoken many times on the scope of conduct
prohibited by section 10(b), but, prior to UnitedStatesv. O'Hagan,it had never
decided the issue of whether the misappropriation theory is a permissible basis
for liability under that provision. One of the earlier Supreme Court cases dealing
with the scope of conduct prohibited by section 10(b) is Superintendent of
Insurancev. Bankers Life & CasualtyCo?7 What has been termed the "touch"
test arose from the Court's following language in this case: "[t]he crux of the
present case is that [the victim] suffered an injury as a result of deceptive
practices touching its sale of securities as an investor."" In O'Hagan,the
government relied on this language for the proposition that section 10(b) does
not require a fiduciary obligation, so long as the deception "touches" the
securities transaction.39 However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with this
interpretation In the immediately preceding paragraph of its opinion, the Court
read section 10(b) to mean that "Congress meant to bar deceptive devices and
contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities. 4 1

34. Id
35. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944-45.
36. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 617 (citing Bryan, 58 F.2d at 944-45).
37. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In
Bankers Life, the Court addressed whether there was a section 10(b) cause of action
where: (1)a corporate investor is defrauded by its own corporate officer and his outside
collaborators; (2) where the securities transaction was not conducted through an
organized market; and (3) where the creditors of the corporate seller may be the ultimate
victims. Id at 6-9.
38. Id at 12-13. The person who deceived the victim owed a fiduciary duty to the
victim, and the victim ofthe fraud in this case was a seller of securities who was injured
as an investor. Id
39. See O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 619.
40. Id
41. Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 12.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Five years later, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,42 the Supreme Court
concluded that a section 10(b) cause of action requires scienter-anintent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. 43 The Court stated that the language of the
statute is the beginning of every analysis involving statutory construction." It
also warned against construing the statutory language too broadly where doing
so would "add a gloss to the operative language of the statute quite different
from its commonly accepted meaning."'45
Most importantly, the Ernst Court addressed the Securities and Exchange
Commission's rule-making power: "The rule-making power granted to an
administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not
the power to make law," but the "power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute."47 The Court made clear that
the scope of Rule 10b-5 cannot exceed the power Congress granted the
Securities and Exchange Commission under section 10(b).4s
In Santa Fe Industries,Inc. v. Green,49 the Supreme Court again addressed
the scope of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The Court considered whether
section 10(b) liability reached a breach of fiduciary duty without any charge of
misrepresentation or lack of disclosure.50 The Court relied heavily on its
previous Ernstdecision51 It reiterated that in determining what constitutes fraud
under Rule lOb-5, it must first look to the language of section 10(b), and that
"[alscertainment of congressional intent... must. . . rest primarily on the
language of that section."52 The Court also reemphasized the Ernst Court's
statement regarding the scope. of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
power to promulgate Rule 10b-5.5 3
The Santa Fe Court found that the language of section 10(b) did not
indicate that Congress intended to prohibit any conduct not amounting to

42. Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
43. Id at 193.
44. Id at 197.
45. Id at 199.
46. Id at213.
47. Id at 214 (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)).
48. Id
49. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
50. Id at 464. More specifically, it involved the reach of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 as they relate to a Delaware short-form merger transaction used by the majority
shareholders of a corporation to eliminate the minority interest. Id.at 464-65. The Court
held that a breach of fiduciary duty alone, without misrepresentation or nondisclosure,
was not sufficient for section 10(b) liability. Id at 462, 473.
51. Id at 472.
52. Id (quoting Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976)).
53. Id at 472-73 (citing Ernst,425 U.S. at 212-14).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/7
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manipulation or deception.' The Court also stated that it had not found any
evidence from the legislative history to support a departure from the language
of the statute.55 Therefore the Court stated that "[w]hen a statute speaks so
specifically in terms of manipulation and deception,... and when its history
reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite unwilling to extend the scope of
the statute."56 The Court concluded its opinion by noting that there "may well
be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern [transactions] such
as that challenged in this complaint. But those standards should not be supplied
by judicial extension of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5....
Although Chiarellav. UnitedStates8 presented the Supreme Court with the
misappropriation theory, the Court refused to address it. This case dealt with a
printer employee who printed tender offers to purchase corporations and other
financial information. The employee used the information he ascertained from
the printed documents and traded on this information, without first disclosing
this knowledge to the sellers of the securities.59 The Court concluded that a
person who fals to disclose material non-public information prior to the
securities transaction has committed fraud, but only when he is under an
obligation to disclose. e' The Court further explained that a duty to disclose
arises only when a person has information that the other party to the securities
transaction has a right to know because of a fiduciary duty or a relationship of
trust and confidence between the two parties.6
The Court reversed Chiarella's convictions because the lower court
effectively instructed the jury that Chiarella had a duty to disclose the material
non-public information to everyone.62 Chiarella was not an "insider" nor did he
have a relationship of trust and confidence with the sellers; he had no prior
dealings with them.P
The Court found that the appellate court's ruling that Chiarella had a duty
to disclose the material non-public information to everyone "rested solely on its
belief that the federal securities laws have created a system providing equal
access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment
decisions, and that use of this information without disclosure by anyone is
fraudulent because it gives certain buyers or sellers an unfair advantage over

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 473.
Id
Id (quoting Ernst, 425 U.S. at 214).
Id at480.
Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
Id at 224.
Id at 228.
Id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
Id at 231.
d at232.
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The Court found this

reasoning defective because "not every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under section 10(b)," and'the "element required
to make silence fraudulent, [a duty to disclose,] is absent in this case."'6 The
Court concluded that a duty to disclose under section 10(b) does not exist from
m
the mere possession of material non-public information.
"
The government asked, in the alternative, for the Court to affirm the
convictions based on the misappropriation theory, arguing that Chiarella
"breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon information
that he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of a printer employed
by the corporation."''
The Court refused to consider whether the
misappropriation theory had merit because the government had failed to submit
it to the jury as a basis for the conviction."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated that he thought the
majority was correct in not addressing the misappropriation theory, but he
thought that "r]espectable arguments could be made in support of either
position."6 9 Justice Brennan's concurring ppinion stated that he thought the
misappropriation theory was a permissible basis for liability under section 10(b),
but Justice Brennan agreed that the Court should not have addressed the issue
since it was not presented to the jury: ° Chief Justice Burger's dissent,however,
embraced the misappropriation theory and believed that it had been presented to
the jury, so Chiarella's convictions should have been affirmed.7 ' Chief Justice
Burger stated that a person may obtain an advantage in the securities market
2
through his superior experience or foresight, but not through unlawful means.
He "would read section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5... to mean that a person who has
misappropriated non-public information has an absolute duty to disclose that
information or refrain from trading."73 Chief Justice Burger noted that the
repeated use of the word "any" supports this interpretation, and that the history
of the statute, that it "assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue
preferences or advantages among investors," also supports this theory. 4

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. (quoting United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978)).
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232.
Id. at235.
Id.
Id at 236.
Id. at 238 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 238-39 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 240.
Id
Id at 241 (interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(5) (1994)).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/7
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The Court reaffirmed its Chiarellaholding in Dirks v. SEC' 5 The decision
outlined the requirements for tippee 76 liability under section 10(b). "It
emphasized that the ChiarellaCourt found that there was "no general duty to
disclose" and "a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of non-public market information."78 The Court stated that it was
"explicit in Chiarellain saying that there can be no duty to disclose where
the person who has traded on inside information 'was not [the corporation's]
agent, ... was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom the sellers [of the
securities] had placed their trust and confidence."' 9
The Dirks Court specifically rejected the "information theory."80 The
information theory, based on the policy argument that the antifraud provisions
require equal information among traders, states that all traders must disclose nonpublic information before trading' The Court stated that the information theory
conflicted with the "principle set forth in Chiarellathat only some persons,
under some circumstances, will be barred from trading while in possession of
material non-public information." Finally, the Dirks Court expressed concern
that "[i]mposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly
receives material non-public information from an insider and trades on it could
have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself
recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market."'

75. 463 U.S. 646 (1982).
76. A "tippee" is a person to whom insiders of a corporation reveal non-public
information about the corporation's stock. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1484 (6th ed.

1990).
77. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659-60 (1983). The Court held that a tippee's
"duty to disclose or abstain from trading is derivative from that of the insider's duty."
Id. at 647. "[W]hen the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by
disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there
has been a breach," the tippee assumes a derivative fiduciary duty to the shareholders not
to trade on the information. Id at 660. However, the Court also held that in order to find
that the insiders breached their fiduciary duty to the shareholders, they must have given
the information to the tippee for the "improper purpose of exploiting the information for
their personal gain." Idat 659. It is this requirement that the insider have the purpose
ofpersonal gain that the dissent attacks as creating a "new, substantive limitation on the
scope of the duty owed by insiders to shareholders," that is contrary to public policy and
has a lack of support from existing law. Id at 671 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
78. Id at 654 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)).
79. Id. (citing Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232) (alteration in original).
80. Id at 657.
81. Id
82. Id.
83. Id at 658 (explaining that analysts commonly seek out information from
corporate officers and other insiders in order to form a basis for determining the worth
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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Carpenterv. UnitedStates" involved an employee of a newspaper who
provided information to outsiders.85 The outsiders would trade on the potential
impact that a column of the newspaper would have on the market 6 The lower
court held that the "deliberate breach of [the newspaper employee's] duty of
confidentiality [to the newspaper] and [subsequent] concealment of the scheme
was a fraud and deceit on the [newspaper]."87 Even though the victim of the
fraud and deceit, the newspaper, was not a buyer or seller of securities, or even
a market participant the Supreme Court considered fraud to be "in connection
with" the sale or purchase ofsecurities within the meaning of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. The lower court stated that the "scheme's sole purpose was to buy
and sell securities at a profit based on advance information of the column's
contents."' The lower court rejected the newspaper employee's argument that
section 10(b) liability cannot be imposed because the victim of the fraud had no
connection to the sale or purchase of securities? ° Thus, the employee effectively
was convicted under section 10(b) based on the misappropriation theory.
The Supreme Court in Carpenterprovided no view as to the validity of the
misappropriation theory as a basis for section 10(b) liability, except to express
that "[t]he Court is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the
securities laws and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those
counts." 9 An affirmance by an evenly divided court is "not entitled to
precedential weight."'"
Finally, in Central Bank v. FirstInterstateBank' 3 the Supreme Court
decided the issue of whether section 10(b) liability extends to those who do not
4
engage in the manipulative or deceptive act, but who aid and abet the violation?
In its analysis, the Court reaffimed the holdings of Ernst," Santa FeI and

ofthe corporation's stock).
84. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
85. IA at 22-23.
86. Id
87. Id at24.
88. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
89. Id
90. Id
91. Id
92. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972).
93. 511 U.S. 164 (1994). The Court held that section 10(b) does not reach those
who only aid and abet a violation ofthis provision. Id at 191. The dissent would allow
liability to attach to those who aid and abet. Id at 192-94 (Stevens, J., joined by
Blackmun, ., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 166-67.
95. Id at 173-74. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
96. CentralBank,511 U.S. at 174. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
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Chiarella regarding the scope of conduct prohibited by section 10(b). The
Court reiterated that in determining the scope of conduct prohibited by section
10(b), the text of the statute controls.98 The Court stated that it had "refused to
allow [Rule] 10b-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of [section
10(b)]. ' The Court mentioned that in determining the scope of section 10(b),
the question is not whether it is good policy to prohibit particular conduct, but
whether the language of section 10(b) covers the conduct.10 "Policy
considerations cannot override [the] interpretation of the text and structure of
[section 10(b)], except to the extent that they may help to show that adherence
to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so bizarre' that Congress could
not have intended it"' ° I
To summarize, the Supreme Court has spoken often about the scope of
conduct prohibited under section 10(b). It has made clear that the language of
section 10(b) is controlling and that policy arguments cannot override the text
of the statute."° The Court, on one occasion, refused to address the
misappropriation theory issue because it was not submitted to the jury.103 On
another occasion, the Court was divided on the issue, so it affirmed the
convictions based on the misappropriation theory, without providing-any
analysis of the issue.' However, the Supreme Court did not express an opinion
on the validity of the misappropriation theory as a basis for liability under
section 10(b).
C. Circuits That Adopted the MisappropriationTheory
as a Basisfor Section 10(b) Liability
The Second Circuit was the first to adopt the misappropriation theory as a
basis for liability under section 10(b). The appellate court affirmed a conviction
under this theory in United States v. Chiarella,'Oswhich the Supreme Court
reversed.)0

97. CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 174. See supranotes 55-68 and accompanying text.
98. CentralBank,511 U.S. at 173, 177.
99. Id at 1731.
100. Id at 177.
101. Id at 188. (citing Demarestv. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)).
102. Id at 173, 177.
103. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980).
104. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987).
105. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd,445 U.S. 222

(1980).
106. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See supra notes 55-68 and
accompanying text.
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Later, in United States v. Newman,'" the Second Circuit successfully
embraced the misappropriation theory. In this case, employees of investment
banking firms misappropriated confidential information about mergers and
acquisitions that clients entrusted to the firm.'01 These employees conveyed this
information to Newman, a securities trader and manager of a brokerage firm,
who purchased stocks in the companies that were takeover targets.'" After the
firm's client announced the merger or acquisition, Newman sold the stocks for
a profit, which he shared with the employees of investment banking firms who
originally gave him the information." 0
The Second Circuit found that the employees of the banking firms had
breached the trust and confidence that the firms' clients placed in them, which
was sufficient to constitute fraud under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5."' In
reaching this conclusion, the court acknowledged that it would start with the
language of the statute." 2 However, the court only discussed Rule lOb-5 in
connection with the scope of conduct prohibited by the statute."' Regarding the
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" language, the court said
that when the cause of action is criminal, 'the court's concern must be the scope
of the Rule, not plaintiff's standing to sue."" 4 It stated that the "courts, not the
Congress, have limited Rule lOb-5 suits for damages to the purchasers and
sellers ofsecurities," so when the action brought is criminal, rather than a private
cause of action for damages, there is no requirement that the fraud be upon the
purchaser or seller of the securities."'
The court indicated that it did not need to spend much time on whether
there was fraud or deceit." 6 In concluding that Newman's conduct constituted
the court relied upon Chief Justice Burger's dissent in
fraud or deceit,
Chiarella."7 The court noted that Newman "misappropriated-stole to put it
bluntly-valuable non-public information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence.""' The court said that Newman and his cohorts defrauded the

107. 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
108. Id at 15.
109. Id
110. IdL111. Id at 15-16.
112. Newman, 664 F.2d at 16.
113. Id at 16-17.
114. Id at 17.
115. Id
116. Id
117. Newman, 664, F.2d at 17.
118. Id (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245 (1980) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/7
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banking firms "as surely as if they took their money."'1 9 The Second Circuit also
found that Newman had wronged the banking firms' clients who had entrusted
their takeover plans with the firms.' 20 Lastly, the court supported its finding of
fraud and deceit with cases which have held misappropriation
of confidential
2
non-public information unlawful in other areas of law.1 '
The Second Circuit found that the fraud was "in connection with" the
purchase or sale of the securities because Newman's sole purpose in receiving
misappropriated information was to purchase stocks for financial gain.' 2 It also
relied upon the "touch" test from SuperintendentofInsurance v. BankersLife &
Casualty Co., where the court said the Supreme Court had construed the "in
connection with" language flexibly to include practices touching the purchase
or sale. n3
In Moss v. MorganStanley, In., 24 the Second Circuit seemed to attack its
n Moss arose out of the same facts as Newman and
own reasoning inNewman."
was a private cause of action for damages by stockholders who had sold their
stock to Newman." 6 The court held that there was no basis for section 10(b)
liability for damages, because Newman owed the stockholders no duty to
disclose the non-public information which he possessed. 7 Newman was neither
an "insider" of the corporation whose stock they were trading, nor did Newman
and the stockholders have a relationship of trust and confidence, one of which
is required before a duty to disclose arises.' The court contrasted its holding
with Newman, where it held that the "transactions [by the employees of the
banking firm] constituted a breach of their fiduciary duty of confidentiality and
loyalty to their employers.., and thereby provided the basis for criminal
prosecution under [section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5]."'n
The Second Circuit later reaffirmed its support of the misappropriation
theory as a basis for criminal liability under section 10(b) in SEC v. Materia.1'0
Under facts very similar to those in Chiarella,3 the court found that the

119. Id
120. Id
121. Id at 18.
122. Id
123. Id. See Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12
(1971). See also supraPart Il.B.
124. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
125. Id at 16.
126. Id at 8-9.
127. Id
128. Id at 11.
129. Id at 13 (citing Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (1981)).
130. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1984).
131. See supranotes 55-68 and accompanying text.
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employee of a printer had committed fraud against his employer under section
10(b).13 2 It explained Moss as having distinguished between civil and criminal
liability under section 10(b), and stated that Newman's misappropriation theory
applied only to criminal prosecutions. 33 The court reiterated that it was the
scope of the rule,34 not the direction in which a duty must be owed, that it was
concerned with.
Adding to the "in connection with" analysis of Newman, the court stated
that "[w]hatever limitations have been read into the 'in connection with'
language in the past, ... it is clear that the requirement is satisfied by the selfevident nexus presented in this case."' 3s The limitation the court referred to was
from a Supreme Court case which held that in private civil actions under section
10(h), the "in connection with" language limits standing to a buyer or seller of
securities." 6
The Third Circuit followed the Second Circuit in Rothberg v.
Rosenbloom. 37 The Third Circuit devoted only one paragraph to the
misappropriation theory issue, relying heavily on distinguishing the facts of
Chiarella.3 1 The court found that Chiarelladealt with a person who did not owe
a fiduciary duty to either the acquiring corporation or the corporation to be
acquired, since he was an employee of a printer of financial merger
information. 39 The Third Circuit contrasted that situation with Rothberg, a
tippee of an insider, who owed a fiduciary duty to the acquiring corporation. 140
The court stated that an "insider on either side of a proposed transaction violates
the insider trading rule when he uses insider information in violation of a
fiduciary duty owed to the corporation to which he owes a duty of
confidentiality."'' The court also made a general reference to Newman in
support of its adoption of the misappropriation theory.'
The Ninth Circuit also adopted the misappropriation theory as a basis for
liability under section 10(b) in SEC v. Clark.'43 The court reviewed the
development of the misappropriation theory through the Second and Third
Circuits and noted that the "careful thought" that went into the analyses and the

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Materia,745 F.2d at 202.
Id
Id
Id at 203.
Id.
(citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)).
Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985).
Id at 822.
Id
Id See supra note 70 (defining "tippee").
Rothberg,771 F.2d at 822.
Id
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
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"consistency with which it has been applied [was] impressive."'". The court
stated that the words "fraud" and "deceit' are vague and provide a "linguistic
frame within which a large number of practices may fit."'" In concluding that
the misappropriation theory fits within the concept of fraud, the court relied on
the meaning of fraud in other federal statutes.'" The court acknowledged that
the fraud must be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. "1 4 1 It
relied on the "touch" test from Bankers Life to say that this issue turns on
whether there is "some nexus between... [the misappropriated information] and
any securities transaction."'14 1 After a lengthy look at the legislative history of
the statute, the court concluded that the statute's history was consistent with
allowing the misappropriation theory as a basis for criminal liability under
section 10(b). 49
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit, in SEC v. Cherif 50 joined the Second,
Third, and Ninth Circuits in adopting the misappropriation theory as a
permissible basis of section 10(b) liability.' 5' The court summarized the support
the misappropriation theory had received from the Second, Third, and Ninth
Circuits, and chose to join them in adopting it.152 In a footnote, the court
explained that"the more precise issues of statutory construction and legislative
history have been treated exhaustively elsewhere," so it would not revisit
them." 3 It supported this decision by stating that the vague word "fraud" can
easily encompass the misappropriation theory, and that adopting this theory
"effectuates the broad purposes behind the securities laws."'"

144. Ad at448.
145. Id
146. Id at 448-49.
147. Id at 449.
148. Id (emphasis added).
149. Id at 449-53.
150. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991). The Seventh Circuit later
affirmed its position in SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 1995).
151. The court also had to determine whether Cherif owed a fiduciary duty to a
former employer, because in civil actions, a person must have breached a fiduciary duty
to a lawful possessor ofnon-public information in order for the misappropriation theory
to be a basis ofliability. Cherif,933 F.2d at 411. For the court's analysis of this issue,
see id at 411-12.
152. Id at 409-10.
153. Id at410 n.5.
154. Id
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D. CircuitsThat Rejected the MisappropriationTheory
as a Basisfor Section 10(b) Liability
In UnitedStates v. Bryan,"'5 the Fourth Circuit became the first circuit to
reject the misappropriation theory as a basis of criminal liability under section
10(b).156 The court found the misappropriation theory to be "irreconcilable" with
recent Supreme Court decisions.'57 The court pointed out that the Supreme
Court had "repeatedly warned against expanding the concept of fraud in the
securities context beyond what the words of [section 10(b)] will reasonably
bear." 5 8
The court stated that manipulation and deception are the "touchstones of
section 10(b) liability" 9 The court noted that the Supreme Court in SantaFe
defined section 10(b) "deception' as the "making ofamaterial misrepresentation
or the nondisclosure ofmaterial information in violation of a duty to disclose.""I
The Supreme Court specifically rejected the Second Circuit's interpretation of
section 10(b) that did not require a misrepresentation or a nondiselosure.' 6'
Furthermore, the court stated that the Supreme Court in Dirks reemphasized that
not all breaches of fiduciary duties are violations of section 10(b), because there
must also be manipulation or deception.'
The Fourth Circuit stated that the Supreme Court "has equally clearly
instructed" that section 10(b) is "primarily if not exclusively concerned with the
deception of purchasers and sellers of securities, but at most extends to
purchasers and sellers, other investors, and persons with a similar stake in an
actual or proposed securities transaction."'6 "It is only the breach of a duty to
these persons that can give rise to a criminal conviction under [section 10(b)],
ifthe statutory requirement that the fraud be in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities is not to be rendered meaningless."'"

155. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
156. Idat 944.
157. Id
158. Id at 945 (citing Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. 164, 173
(1994) (the text of section 10(b) is controlling with respect to the scope of conduct
prohibited); Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234 (1980) (section 10(b) cannot
be read more broadly than the language of the provision permits)).
159. Id
160. Id at 946. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470 (1977). See
also Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 174 (reaffirming the requirement of either a
misrepresentation or a nondisclosure).
161. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 946 (4th Cir. 1995).
162. Id (citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,654 (1982)).
163. Id
164. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 946.
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In concluding that the misappropriation theory is not a permissible basis for
section 10(b) criminal liability, the court addressed some policy concerns. 16 The
court discussed how the misappropriation theory creates uncertainty and
unpredictability in the securities laws." As an example, it pointed out that the
Second Circuit, which was the first to adopt the misappropriation theory, has
"repeatedly grappl[ed] with its own misappropriation theory."' 67 It stated that
section 10(b) is "not concerned with the general fairness of securities
transactions themselves, so long as there is no evidence of deception." 6 8 The
court did not believe that rejecting the misappropriation theory would hinder
federal efforts to combat securities fraud. 169 Lastly, the court explained that its
own "perceptions of what is wise or fair are ultimately of no relevance," and that
the court is "bound by the actual prohibitions enacted by Congress."'
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision in Bryan, the Eighth Circuit
rejected the misappropriation theory as a basis for section 10(b) liability in
7
UnitedStatesv. O'Hagan."
' In rejecting this theory, the Eighth Circuit relied
heavily on the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Bryan.72 The court found
unpersuasive the decisions of those circuits that had adopted the
misappropriation theory as a basis for section 10(b) liability. 73

165. Id at 952-53.
166. Id at 952 (giving examples of the difficulties courts have grappled with in
their efforts to determine which relationships of trust and confidence give rise to section
10(b) liability).
167. Id at 951. See id at 954-59 (analyzing the Second Circuit cases Newman,
Moss, Materia, and Chestman). See also id at 957-58 (other circuits adopting the
misappropriation theory by referring to Newman, without conducting their own analysis,
or without discussing SantaFe).
168. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 952.
169. Id at 953 ("Many of the people who would fall within the ambit of the
misappropriation theory... already owe a duty to purchasers and sellers of securities to
disclose or abstain from trading, duties recognized by the Supreme Court ....
The
Second Circuit has acknowledged as much. ' ) (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566). Most
conduct will fall under other federal statutes, such as the mail and wire fraud statutes.
Id
170. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 959.
171. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
117 S. Ct 759, rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
172. Id. at 620; see Bryan, 58 F.3d at 933.
173. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 620. The Eighth Circuit found that the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits adopted the misappropriation theory without conducting
either a thorough analysis of the text of section 10(b) or the Supreme Court decisions
regarding section 10(b). Id at 621. The Second Circuit adopted the misappropriation
theory without referring to the language of section 10(b), without citing Santa Fe, and
with only slight mention ofthe Chiarellamajority opinion. Id (citing Newman, 664 F.2d
12, 16-19 (2d Cir. 1981)). The Second Circuit instead relied heavily on the language of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1997
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The court's analysis primarily focused on the language of the statute
because the text ofthe statute was determinative when construing the scope of
conduct prohibited under section 10(b).174 The conduct prohibited was limited
to conduct constituting "deception... in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security," since Rule lOb-5's prohibition of "fraud" could not be
construed more broadly than "deception" under section 10(b).17 The Eighth
Circuit reasoned that the misappropriation theory did not require deception, even

Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella. Id
The other circuits who had recognized the misappropriation theory either relied
heavily on Newman or "utilized interpretational methods which conflict with the
Supreme Court's teachings on interpreting the scope of conduct encompassed by
§ 10(b)." O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 621. See Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818, 822
(3d Cir. 1985) (relying solely on Newman); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 n.5 (7th
Cir. 1991) (relying on Newman and stating that the interpretation of the text of section
10(b) had already been "exhaustively" covered); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439,443-53
(9th Cir. 1990) (relying in part on Newman and also utilizing the meaning of fraud in
other contexts).
The O'Hagancourt concluded that the circuits that recognize the misappropriation
theory have appeared to validate it based upon the policy that it is unfair to allow a
person to trade securities based upon on information that is not available to other traders.
O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 620. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029 (1986)
(misappropriation theory permissible to give "legal effect to the commonsensical view
that trading on the basis of improperly obtained information is fundamentally
unf*... :). The Carpenter court agreed with the Fourth Circuit in its finding that the

circuits which have recognized the misappropriation theory have given "insufficient
weight to the text of § 10(b) and improperly construed the Supreme Court's
pronouncements on the reach of that provision." O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 621-22.
174. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 616. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S.
164, 173 (1994) (the statute controls in determining the conduct prohibited under section
10(b); Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222,234 (1980) (section 10(b) cannot be read
more broadly than its language allows).
175. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
117S. Ct 759, rev'd, 177S. Ct. 2199(1997); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994). See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1997) ('To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or] ...[t]o
engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon a person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security:).
See alsoCentral Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 511 U.S. at 173 (1994) ("We have
refused to allow lob-5 challenges to conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute.");
Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,472 (1977) ("[In deciding whether [challenged
conduct constitutes] 'fraud' under Rule lOb-5, 'we turn first to the language of §
10(b).') (quoting Ernst & Emstv. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)); United States
v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 945 (4th Cir. 1995) ("For at least two decades, ... the Supreme
Court has repeatedly warned against expanding the concept of fraud in the securities
context beyond what the words of the Act will reasonably bear.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/7
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"' . Even if the
though the text of section 10(b) requires it for criminal liability. 76

misappropriation theory did require deception, the requirement that the deception

be "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security" negated it.

77

The Eighth Circuit looked to the Supreme Court for the definition of
deception.'78 The court stated that the Supreme Court "has repeatedly held that
the deception prohibited under section 10(b) consists of the making of a material

misrepresentation or the nondisclosure of material information, in violation of
a duty to disclose.' ' 79 The Supreme Court had "left no doubt that section 10(b)
deception cannot be premised on the mere breach of a fiduciary duty, without an
accompanying misrepresentation or lack of disclosure."'80 Thus, the Eighth
Circuit rejected the misappropriation theory in part because, by the theory's

definition, it required neither a material misrepresentation nor a nondisclosure.' 8'
The Eighth Circuit also rejected the misappropriation theory because it
"permits liability for a breach of duty owed to individuals who are unconnected
to and perhaps uninterested in a securities transaction, thus rendering
meaningless the 'in connection with...' statutory language."'1 2 The court
reasoned that the Supreme Court's decisions in Chiarella,83 Dirks,18 and

176. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 617.
177. Id
178. Id
179. Id *See CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 177 ("As in earlier cases considering
conduct prohibited by § 10(b), we again conclude that the statute prohibits only the
making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission of a manipulative
act."); Santa Fe Indus. Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 470-76 (explicitly rejecting a lower
court's reading ofsection 10(b) which required no misrepresentation or nondisclosure).
180. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 618. See CentralBank, 511 U.S. at 174 (quoting Santa
Fe,430 U.S. at 470) ("deception" under section 10(b) does not encompass "breaches of
fiduciary duty ... without any charge ofmisrepresentation or lack of disclosure."); Santa
Fe, 430 U.S. at 472 (to interpret "fraud under Rule 10b-5 to extend to all breaches of
fiduciary duty that are linked to a securities transaction would "add a gloss to the
operative language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning");
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1982) ("Not all breaches of fiduciary duty in
connection with a securities transaction ... come within the ambit of Rule 10b-5. There
must also be manipulation or deception.").
181. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 618.
182. Id
183. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 228-32 (holding that Rule 10b-5 fraud is committed by
failing to disclose material non-public information in violation of a duty to disclose,
which arises only "from a relationship of trust and confidence between the parties to a
transaction," and that liability can only be founded on the breach of a fiduciary obligation
by a "person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence"). See supranotes
55-68 and accompanying text.
184. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654 (quoting Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232) (reaffirming
Chiarella'sholding that "there can be no duty to disclose where the person who has
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CentralBank,'81"revealed that only a breach ofa duty to parties to the securities
transaction or, at the most, to other market participants such as investors, will be
sufficient to give rise to § 10(b) liability."' 6
The government petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict among
the circuits. 7
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Justice Ginsburg'sOpinionfor the Majority
The Supreme Court began with an analysis of the language of section
10(b). 8 The Court reiterated that section 10(b) prohibits: "(1) using any
deceptive device (2) in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, in
contravention of rules prescribed by the Commission."'8 9 The Court stated that
the "in connection with the purchase or sale ofsecurities" language did not limit

traded inside information 'was not [the corporation's] agent, ... was not a fiduciary, [or]
was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and
confidence."'). See supranotes 69-76 and accompanying text.
185. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 171-73 (focusing section 10(b) liability on
purchasers and sellers of securities). See supranotes 85-93 and accompanying text.
186. O'Hagan,92F.3dat618. The court stated thatthe Supreme Court has relied
on the policy of the Act,"to protect investors from false and misleading practices that
might injure them," to support this limitation. Id at 619 (quoting CentralBank, 114
S.Ct. at 1446).
The government argued that the "in connection with" requirement was met
whenever a fraud "touched" the purchase or sale of a security, so that the fraud need not
be upon a person interested in a securities transaction. Id The court rejected the
government's interpretation ofBankers Lfe & Casualtyas overly broad and inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's decision which stated that Congress meant for section 10(b)
"to bar deceptive devices and contrivances in the purchase or sale of securities." Id
(quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971));
see supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. The court also found important that the
victim ofthe fraud in the BankersLife & Casualtycase was a seller of securities who was
"injured as an investor." Id (quoting Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 10). Finally, the
O'Hagancourt concluded that if the Supreme Court intended the interpretation that the
government contended, then the defendants in subsequent Supreme Court cases would
not have escaped liability, because each engaged in conduct that "touched" the securities
transaction. Idr (referring to Chiarella,Dirks, and Central Bank).
187. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 759 (1997).
188. 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2206-08 (1997). The Court reiterated that liability under
Rule 10b-5 could not extend beyond that conduct prohibited by section 10(b). Id
189. Id
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol62/iss3/7
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the application of the statute to only deception of a seller or purchaser of
securities."*
The Court explained that the classical and misappropriation theories are
complimentary in that they both address efforts "to capitalize on nonpublic
information through the purchase or sale of securities." 1 ' The classical theory
targets trading of securities where there is a breach of duty to shareholders of a
corporation, whereas the misappropriation theory targets a breach of duty to the
source of the nonpublic information."9
The Court found O'Hagan's conduct to be deceptive. 93 O'Hagan owed a
duty to both his law firm and his firm's client to keep the information
confidential and to not use it for his personal profit.'" When O'Hagan traded
based on the non-public information without disclosing his intentions to either
his firm or his firm's client, his conduct amounted to deception." Had O'Hagan
disclosed all pertinent facts to both his law firm and his firm's client, then he
could not have been liable under section 10(b) because there would not have
been the required deception through nondisclosure'
The Court also found O'Hagan's deception to be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security," since the breach of duty and the securities
transaction coincided."9 O'Hagan's fraud was consummated when he used the
information to trade in securities without disclosure to the source of the
information, not when he received the information.'98 The Court suggested that
if O'Hagan had not traded on the information, but instead had put it to another
use, then he would not have been liable under section 10(b). 11
The Court clarified the limits of the misappropriation theory: if a person
used money which he received through embezzlement or fraud to purchase
securities, then the misappropriation theory would not apply.2 The Court
reasoned that, because such ill-gotten money can be used for many purposes
other than buying securities, the deception in such a case would not be

190. Id
191. Id
192. Id

193. O'Hagan,117 S.Ct. at 2208.
194. Id
195. Id.
196. Id at 2209. See Santa Fe Indus. Inc., v. Green 430 U.S. 462, 474-76 (1977)
(person charged with violating section 10(b) had disclosed all pertinent facts to the
person to whom he owed a duty of confidentiality, so there was no deception through
nondisclosure which supported section 10(b) liability).
197. O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2209. See 15 U.S.C.§ 78j(b) (1994).
198. O'Hagan,117 S.Ct. at 2209.
199. Id
200. Id
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sufficiently connected to the securities transaction.20 ' The Court distinguished,
however, the fraudulent use of non-public information, as opposed to money.2
For the Court, there was no question that the fraudulent use of confidential
information, such as the information in this case, falls within section 10(b)'s
prohibition where such information "ordinarily 3 is used only to trade in
securities °4
The Court also noted that strong policy considerations supported its
decision. According to the Court, the purpose ofthe Securities and Exchange
Act is "to insure honest securities markets and thereby promote investor
confidence."" The Court expressed concern that people would likely hesitate
to invest in a market "where trading based on misappropriated nonpublic
information is unchecked by law."
The Court summarized that "considering the inhibiting impact on market
participation of trading on misappropriated information, and the congressional
purposes underlying § 10(b)," it made sense to permit the misappropriation
theory as a basis for section 10(b) liability, and that the language of section 10(b)
did not require otherwise.208
The Court spent considerable time addressing the Eighth Circuit's reasons
for rejecting the misappropriation theory.2 9 First, the Court reiterated that the
Eighth Circuit's finding that the misappropriation theory required neither
misrepresentation nor disclosure was incorrect.2 " O'Hagan's failure to disclose
the pertinent facts to his law firm and his firm's client pursuant to his duty to do
so was sufficient deception to support section 10(b) liability.?"
Second, the Court addressed the Eighth Circuit's contention that the
misappropriation theory did not satisfy the "in connection with the purchase or
sale ofany security" requirement for section 10(b) liability? 2 The Court noted
that the Eighth Circuit relied on three prior Supreme Court decisions in

201. Id
202. Id

203. The Court explained that the government made an "overstatement" when it
argued that the kind of confidential information in this case derived its value "only from
at 2210. The dissent struggled with the majority's
its utility in securities trading." Id.
explanation and modification of the government's theory. See supra Part IV.B.
204. O'Hagan,117 S. CL at 2210.
205. Id
206. Id
207. Id
208. Idat2210-11.
209. Idat2211-14.
210. O'Hagan, 117 S.Ct. at 2211.
211. Id
212. Id
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concluding that only a breach of duty to parties to the securities transaction, or
at least market investors, supplied the requisite connection.21 3 The Supreme
Court disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's reading of its precedent.' 4 It reviewed
the three cases relied upon by the Eighth Circuit, and explained why they did not
support the rejection of the misappropriation theory.2 5 The Court stated that
Chiarellastands for the proposition that no general obligation exists between
parties to a securities transaction to disclose material, non-public information?' 6
Such a duty arises only between two parties having a relationship of trust and
confidence.' 7 The Court explained that the Eighth Circuit took these statements
to imply that a duty to disclose could arise only between parties to the securities
transaction.' 8 The Eighth Circuit, however, did not take into account that the
Supreme Court had refused to address whether the misappropriation theory was
a permissible basis for liability.2 9 The Supreme Court had not rejected the
theory in Chiarella,but simply had not addressed the issue. 2
Next, the Court explained that the Eighth Circuit misinterpreted its decision
in Dirks primarily by relying on the language cited from Chiarella.21 The Court
stated that Dirksheld that there was no general duty for a tippee to refrain from
disclosing non-public information to people likely to trade on the basis of such
information.m The corporate insiders had given the tippee non-public
information for the purpose of revealing fraud, and they had no expectation that
the tippee would keep the information confidential.2 Therefore, because the
corporate insiders did not misappropriate the information, the tippee could not
have done so either.2 4 The Eighth Circuit incorrectly interpreted this to mean
that only a failure to disclose non-public information to a party of the
transaction, where there was a duty to do so, could result in section 10(b)
liability.2S
Lastly, the Court explained the Eighth Circuit's misinterpretation of Central
Bank u The CentralBank Court held that a private plaintiff cannot "maintain

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id
Id
Id at2211-14.
Id at 2211. See Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 233 (1980).
117 S.Ct. at 2212. See Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233.
117 S.Ct. at 2212-13.
Id
Id
Id at 2212 n.10. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
O'Hagan,117 S.Ct. at 2212-13.
Id
Id
Id
Id See Central Bank v. First State Bank, 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
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an aiding and abeting suit under § 10(b)." 7 The Court cautioned that a
secondary actor, such as an attorney or an accountant, could be held primarily
liable under section 10(b) if he used a deceptive device upon which a buyer or
seller of securities relied. 8 The Eighth Circuit misread that statement to imply
that section 10(b) covered only deceptive misstatements to market participants.2
The Court meant only to clarify that while a secondary actor could not be held
secondarily liable for aiding and abetting, he could still be held primarily
liable? The Court also explained that CentralBank dealt only with private
civil litigation, and that there had been a longstanding distinction between
criminal liability and civil liability with regard to section 10(b)?
In conclusion, the Court accepted the application of the misappropriation
theory, noting that the theory is consistent with the Court's precedent and with
the language ofthe statute. 32
B. Dissenting OpinionsofJusticesScalia and Thomas
Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court's decision to accept the
misappropriation theory as a basis for section 10(b) liability. 3 Because,
according to Justice Scalia, the language of section 10(b) is ambiguous with
regard to whether or not the deception must be of a party to a securities
transaction, Justice Scalia would invoke the rule of lenity? 4 Thus, the
misappropriation theory would not be a permissible basis for liability since the
statutory language does not clearly indicate such a result. 5
Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquistjoined? Justice Thomas disagreed with the majority's determination
of the circumstances in which a deceptive device is "in connection with" a
securities transaction? 7 He found the majority's distinction between
embezzlement of funds and misappropriation of information incoherent, because
information, like money, could be used for many purposes.?8 Justice Thomas

227. O'Hagan,117 S.Ct. at 2213. See CentralBank,511 U.S. at 191.
228. O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2213.
229. Id
230. Id
231. Id
232. Idat2213-14.
233. Id at 2220. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
234. Id
235. O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2220.
236. Idat 2220-26. (Thomas, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J.,joined, concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
237. Idat 2221.
238. Idat 2221-22.
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also disagreed with the majority's substitution of the word "ordinarily" for the
government's choice ofthe word "only" regarding the propensity of information
to be used in a securities transactionP 9 He expressed concern that the Court, by
changing the wording, applied a new theory that the government did not consider
or ask for.24
Finally, Justice Thomas dissented from the majority's reliance on the
"purpose" of the statute. 4' He stated that "regardless ofthe overarching purpose
of the securities laws, it is not illegal to run afoul of the 'purpose' of a statute,
only its letter."24 2 Furthermore, Justice Thomas noted that the market is hurt
equally whether or not a party to a securities transaction discloses his trading to
the source ofhis information 3 The other party to the transaction is still on an
unequal playing field, because the other party does not have the same non-public
information.2"
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court's opinion in O'Haganclarified an issue that had been
the subject of great differences. 245 Even those who may disagree with the
Court's holding can appreciate the Court's thorough analyis of the issue. The
Court discussed both the statutory language of section 10(b) and previous
Supreme Court decisions interpreting that section, and gave valuable insight into
how the Court reads its prior decisions.246 The Eighth Circuit's careful
interpretation of the Supreme Court's teachings seemed well-reasoned.2 47
Perhaps for that reason, the Supreme Court felt it necessary to discuss the
primary cases in some detail and explain the Eighth Circuit's misinterpretation
of those holdings2 8
Despite the Supreme Court's detailed analysis, the Court's explanation of
the manner in which O'Hagan's deception was "in connection with" the sale of

239. Idat 2223-25.
240. O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2223-25.
241. Idat 2225-26.
242. I/at 2225.
243. Id.
at 2225-26.
244. Id
245. See supraPart III.
246. See United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2206-13 (1997).
247. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612,617-22 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S.
Ct. 2199 (1997). The court acknowledged the strong policy considerations, but did not
decide the case based on those considerations. Id.
at 628. While the court adopted the
Fourth Circuit's analysis from Bryan, it did not do so blindly. Id at 620.
248. O'Hagan,117 S.Ct. at 2221-23.
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the securities may cause some confusion in the future.4 9 Future parties may find
the Court's distinction between stealing money to buy securities and using nonpublic information to buy securities without disclosing the facts to the source of
the information difficult to apply to other situations?5 0 Justice Thomas' dissent
certainly cast doubt on the strength of the majority's reasoning with regard to
that distinctionl-a distinction crucial to the Court's 2approval of the
misappropriation theory as a basis for section 10(b) liability. 1
Meanwhile, Justice Scalia's reliance on the rule of lenity as the basis for his
rejection of the misappropriation theory appears to be a novel concept discussed
by neither the Eighth Circuit nor the Supreme Court majority.5 3 Essentially,
Justice Scalia revealed the unfairness of holding O'Hagan liable for violating a
criminal statute when it was unclear whether Congress intended that his conduct
be a basis for liability. Considering the disagreement among the circuits, the
Supreme Court at least should have acknowledged Justice Scalia's application
of the rule of lenity.
Conspicuously, the Court never stated that the statutory language expressed
an intention by Congress to incorporate the misappropriation theory. The Court
noted only that nothing in the language of section 10(b) precluded the
application of the misappropriation theoryY4 In fact, the Court discussed its
prior line of cases to demonstrate that applying the misappropriation theory
would not be inconsistent with its precedent; not that its precedent required or
even strongly suggested such an application.5 s

249. Id at 2209-11.
250. Id
251. Id at 2221-25. (Thomas, J., with whom Rehnquist, C.J.,joins, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
252. Id at 2206-07.
253. Id at 2220. (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

-254. O'Hagan,117 S. Ct. at 2211.
255. Id at 2211-14.
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The Court's decision to permit liability based upon the misappropriation
theory seems primarily to be driven by strong policy considerations. After a
thorough analysis of the statute and prior Supreme Court cases, the Court
summarized the basis for its holding:
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on misappropriated information, and the
congressional purposes underlying § 10(b), it makes scant sense to hold a lawyer
like O'Hagan a § 10(b) violator if he works for a law firm representing the target
of a tender offer, but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder. The
text ofthe statute requires no such result'
The Supreme Court seems to have based its decision on its sense of the
conduct the statute should prohibit, rather than the conduct Congress, by its plain
language, clearly prohibited. As Justice Thomas noted, holding O'Hagan liable
under section 10(b) on the present facts, but not holding him liable should he
disclose his trading to his law firm and the firm's client, makes little sense. The
5 7 The Court, however, dismissed such a
impact on the market is the same.2
concern when it was raised by Justice Thomas' dissent, reasoning that a partial
solution is just as permissible as a complete solution?"
The Court could have rejected the misappropriation theory without
condoning O'Hagan's conductY 9 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit felt strongly that
O'Hagan's conduct was "unethical and immoral and [should be] condemned."'2 '
Nevertheless, as the Eighth Circuit noted, not every unethical or immoral act is
illegal.261 And as Justice Thomas stated, "it is not illegal to run afoul of the
'purpose' of a statute, only its letter."' 6 Aside from section 10(b) liability, there
are other remedies available to deter such conduct.263 For example, the Court
could have left the issue to Congress to clarify its intentions by amending the
statute.

256. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199,2210-11 (1997).
257. See idat 2225-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
258. Idat2211, n.9.
259. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 628 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997).
260. Id
261. See O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 628 ("Lilt is a fundamental principle of the criminal
law that not every ethical or moral transgression falls within its realm. This case is a
prime example of that principle.").
262. United States v. O'Hagan, 177 S. Ct. 2199, 2225 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also id at 2225-26 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, and responding to the Court's policy concerns).
263. O'Hagan,92 F.3d at 628. ("O'Hagan was disbarred in Minnesota, and served
a 30-month sentence after being convicted in Minnesota state court for invading clients'
trust funds.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
One does not have to agree with the Supreme Court's holding to respect
what the Court has accomplished with its opinion in United States v. O'Hagan.
The Court clarified a confusing line of Supreme Court cases and gave a full
explanation of the Eighth Circuit's mis-steps in interpreting the Supreme Court's
holdings. The Court also gave valuable insight into the weight of policy
considerations when interpreting section 10(b). However, only time will tell
whether the Court's opinion in fact settled a complicated issue, or simply created
more confusion regarding the application of the misappropriation theory to
factual scenarios different from the one in O'Hagan.
HEATHERL. RErNSCH
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